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Abstract 
With the Cotonou Agreement due to expire in 2020, formal negotiations towards a new 
partnership agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states 
began in September 2018. Based on the acceptance of the EU’s negotiating mandate, the 
new arrangement will be primarily organised via three specific regional protocols with each 
of the ACP regions. Meanwhile, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) launched in 2007, has 
seen the African Union (AU) gain increased prominence as an institutional partner of the 
EU. Given its ambitious pan-African agenda, it adopted an alternative ‘African’ vision for 
future EU-ACP relations, to the mandate agreed by the ACP states and expressed a 
willingness to become directly involved in the negotiations. This article contributes an 
important new case-study to the existing literature on ‘African agency’ in international 
politics by considering the scope for Africa to exert agency within the post-Cotonou 
negotiations, given the negotiation of a specific regional compact with Africa. It adopts a 
structurally embedded view of agency, based on Cox’s understanding of historical 
structures, as a fit between institutions, ideas and material relations. The central argument 
is that, in comparison to the negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement two decades ago, there 
is greater scope for African agency. However, both the ideational and material aspects of 
Africa’s relationship with the EU, condition the limits to how effective such agency might 
be. Moreover, tensions at the institutional level between the ACP and AU further undermine 
the potential for effective African agency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
September 2018 saw the start of formal negotiations between the EU and African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states towards a new partnership agreement.1 This new 
arrangement will replace the Cotonou Agreement, which has governed EU-ACP relations 
for a twenty-year period since 2000.2 Previously, during the negotiation of the Cotonou 
Agreement, ACP states had expressed a preference for maintaining both the unity of their 
group and a trade relationship based on non-reciprocity, but instead the EU’s vision for 
regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) based on reciprocal trade liberalisation 
was adopted. In essence, ‘there was little evidence of ACP states shaping the agenda’ 
(Hurt et al. 2013: 72).  
This article focuses on the post-Cotonou negotiations with Africa and is specifically 
concerned with the scope for increased ‘African agency’ in shaping a new relationship with 
the EU. This is something that, rhetorically at least, EU officials suggested is central to 
their vision for the negotiations. For example, in December 2017, then EU Commissioner 
for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, suggested that the 
forthcoming negotiations, between the EU and ACP, provided a ‘unique opportunity to 
shape a true partnership of equals, moving beyond traditional donor-recipient perceptions’ 
(DG International Cooperation and Development 2017). Similarly, Carlos Lopes, appointed 
by the African Union (AU) as High Representative to support member states in the post-
Cotonou negotiations, has argued that ‘Africa has a historic opportunity to change its 
relationship with Europe’ (Lopes 2018).  
In sharp contrast to this official rhetoric, many commentators have questioned the 
significance and relevance of a new EU-ACP framework. It has been suggested that the 
‘fundamental question is whether an agreement between the EU and the member states’ 
former colonies is still relevant at all’ (Schmieg 2019: 1). The Cotonou Agreement was 
based on a traditional North-South relationship, which now looks increasingly out of step 
with a global development agenda, reflected in the adoption of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, by all UN member states (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019: 
1).  
Despite this changing global landscape, the post-Cotonou negotiating mandate of the ACP 
states expressed a desire for continuity in the structure of the EU-ACP relationship. It 
called for ‘a single Agreement which … should maintain and build on the acquis of the 
Cotonou Agreement through a single negotiating framework and single undertaking’ (ACP 
Council of Ministers 2018: 6). This ACP vision proposed a structure based on three pillars 
(trade, investment and services; development cooperation; political dialogue and 
advocacy), closely resembling the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. By contrast, the 
EU proposed a more significant overhaul by outlining a new structure for the post-Cotonou 
agreement, which the ACP states reluctantly accepted in December 2018 (Medinilla and 
Bossuyt 2019: 1). As a result, there will be an umbrella framework agreed with the ACP 
Group as a whole covering general objectives and principles, with three specific regional 
compacts operating underneath this with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific respectively. 
The EU has also been clear in emphasising that the ‘centre of gravity will be on the regional 
compacts’ (European Commission 2017: 2).  
This article interrogates the rhetorical claims made by policymakers to the potential for 
Africa to influence the terms of a new post-Cotonou agreement with the EU. In doing so, 
it makes an original contribution to the literature by advancing the wider debate on ‘African 
agency’ in international politics. It also contributes to the specific literature on EU-ACP 
relations, by adopting a different perspective from the majority of analysis, which tends 
to take an EU-centric viewpoint. The article is based on analysis of both primary documents 
published before and during the post-Cotonou negotiations together with secondary 
literature. The most significant of these primary documents include the negotiating 
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mandates adopted by the ACP Council of Ministers and the Council of the European Union, 
statements by the AU in relation to the negotiations and key documents produced by the 
European Commission (including a consultation paper) prior to the start of the formal 
negotiations. The experience of the Cotonou negotiations is instructive here in highlighting 
the significant agenda-setting role played by the European Commission in setting out in a 
Green Paper, what became the broad framework of the final agreement (European 
Commission 1996). This time around it was already evident in 2016 that the plan was to 
include regional compacts in the post-Cotonou Agreement (European Commission 2016a).  
In assessing the scope for ‘African agency’, the article begins by outlining the value in 
adopting a Coxian theoretical framework. Taking a critical approach allows us to stand 
‘back from the existing order of things to ask how that order came into being, how it may 
be changing, and how that change may be influenced or channeled’ (Cox 1992/1996: 
525). It is argued that this approach avoids either a position that dismisses ‘African 
agency’ as impossible, or an uncritical assertion of its significance. The article then takes 
stock of the changing historical structure within which the post-Cotonou negotiations are 
taking place before evaluating the role played by key African institutions, the dominant 
ideas, together with the material relations between the EU and Africa, which set the 
parameters of the negotiations.  
 
The central argument is that the current historical structure and in particular important 
institutional developments (especially within the AU) suggest there is potential for more 
African agency in the post-Cotonou negotiations, than was exercised during the 
negotiation of the previous arrangement agreed two decades ago. However, tensions 
between the ACP and AU have undermined attempts to develop a common African position 
towards the continent’s relations with the EU, which have compromised these institutional 
opportunities. Moreover, at an ideational level the underlying neoliberal assumptions in 
relation to African development, still place significant limits on the potential for African 
agency. The EU envisages a greater role for the private sector and remains determined to 
continue to base its trade relationship with Africa on EPAs in the short-medium term. EPAs 
remain highly problematic given that they limit the policy space available to African 
governments and lock-in the economies of Africa to a neo-colonial relationship with Europe 
(see Hurt 2012). In recent years, African institutions have expressed bold aims for 
industrialisation and job creation (see AU 2008 and UN Economic Commission for Africa 
2017) but the EU’s vision will hinder, rather than support, this ambition. Finally, when 
considering African agency we also need to consider the scope for non-state actors to 
influence the negotiations. The final section of the article discusses this, before concluding 
by suggesting that future relations organised between the EU and AU, offer greater 
prospects for achieving African agency, than the re-negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement.  
 
UNDERSTANDING ‘AFRICAN AGENCY’ 
Africa has never been a passive actor in international affairs. For many years, however, 
the literature on Africa’s international relations had focused primarily on its marginality 
within the international system. Even more contemporary analysis, underpinned by the 
neorealist assumption of a self-help system, still comes to the inevitable conclusion that 
Africa remains peripheral due to the weak material capabilities of its states (Andreasson 
2013). Most research on the engagement of external actors with the continent has tended 
to treat Africa as an inactive recipient of their policymaking. Starting from the assumption 
of marginality, however, is problematic, given that Africa ‘has in fact been dialectically 
linked, both shaping and being shaped by international processes and structures’ (Taylor 
and Williams 2004: 1). From a critical perspective, structuralist readings have tended to 
dominate the analysis of Africa’s place in the world economy. They have viewed Africa ‘as 
part of the global periphery, an agency-less victim of great power/core manipulations’ 
(Chipaike and Knowledge 2018: 2). As Harman and Brown have convincingly argued, the 
danger is that such ‘a focus on structure without a more detailed consideration or 
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acknowledgement of agency binds Africa’s international relations into a narrow and 
predetermined position’ (2013: 86). 
 
As a corrective to this focus on marginality, in recent years we have seen an emerging 
literature on ‘African agency’, reflecting the perception that Africa’s place in the global 
political economy is changing. In tandem with this, it has become noticeable that Western 
policymakers are now keen to remind us that Africa offers untold potential. For example, 
in his 2018 State of the Union address to the European Parliament, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
then President of the European Commission, said, ‘By 2050 … one in four people on earth 
will be African. We need to invest more in our relationship with the nations of this great 
and noble continent’ (Juncker 2018). 
 
In the specific literature on EU-ACP relations, there is only limited engagement with these 
broader debates on African agency. In the main, the concept has featured most noticeably 
in the work of scholars adopting a constructivist theoretical lens. The main focus has been 
the extent to which African actors have been able to exert agency in the negotiation of 
EPAs with the EU. One such study suggests that African actors have been able to employ 
a mimetic challenge, by using official EU discourse describing EPAs as development 
partnerships, to ‘influence outcomes (in this case no agreement on comprehensive EPAs) 
in ways that would not be possible if the negotiations were determined by material power 
alone’ (Hurt et al. 2013: 69). More specifically, Murray-Evans (2015) provides a nuanced 
account of the EPA talks with Southern African countries, highlighting the variety of 
positions taken by states in this region and the significance of South African negotiators 
in securing concessions from the EU. Meanwhile, Trommer (2011), in a discussion of the 
EPA negotiations with West African states, notes the significance of the role played by 
NGOs based in the region, enabling African states to challenge the developmental rhetoric 
of the EU. 
 
This focus on the agency of Africa in world politics is to be welcomed. Starting our analysis 
from the perspective of ‘African agency’ allows us to look at EU-ACP relations in different 
ways to those that dominate the orthodox analysis of many scholars in European studies. 
However, ‘what the optimistic discourse on African agency fails to sufficiently acknowledge 
is the persistence of wider structures (both material and ideational) that set the 
parameters of Africa’s engagement in the global political economy’ (Hurt 2013: 52). 
Hence, we need a conceptualisation of ‘agency’ that gets beyond seeing it as simply a 
synonym for an ability to exact influence. Instead, as Brown argues, we should employ a 
structurally embedded understanding, whereby ‘agency needs to be seen as both creative 
and reproductive of existing structural relationships, as well as, potentially at least, 
transformative of them’ (2012: 1895). 
 
In sum, much of the existing literature on Africa has framed the debate as being between 
‘dependency’ and ‘agency’. This article portrays a more nuanced picture, by steering a 
course between those who simply dismiss African agency altogether and others who assert 
it as self-evident. In so doing, it advances the debate on African agency by avoiding two 
important limitations: structural determinism and an account that lacks historical 
specificity. 
 
This is achieved by employing a Coxian understanding of historical structures, a 
conceptualisation which ‘does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but 
imposes pressures and constraints’ (Cox 1981: 135). A Coxian framework helps us to 
understand the structural limits to agency. For Cox, structures are dynamic rather than 
being fixed and immutable. Hence, there is scope for agency. Historical structures, Cox 
argues, are ‘made by collective human activity and transformed through collective human 
activity’ (1987: 4). He understands historical structures as being composed of the 
interaction between three key elements: material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox 
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1981: 136). Together they form the basis of the main dimensions of structural power, 
which condition the possibilities for agency within the global political economy. 
 
A Coxian approach also avoids an ahistorical understanding of the structure of 
international relations. It allows an appreciation of ‘how social relations in the present of 
any particular era, are, to some extent, prefigured by the past’ (Bieler and Morton 2001: 
18). Therefore, in relation to the focus of this article, it is important to acknowledge the 
significance of the historical development of EU-ACP relations. The post-Cotonou 
negotiations build on previous arrangements and do not take place outside of this history. 
Those who assert an increase in African agency tend to justify their position with reference 
to the increasing material significance of the continent. For example, Lopes (2019), has 
suggested that ‘the last two decades have further empowered African countries, as 
economic development has been translated into increased diplomatic capacity, and 
socioeconomic potential has given weight to a more assertive leadership’. A Coxian 
framework, by contrast, emphasises the importance of considering the ideational 
alongside the material. Hence, the relationship between the three aspects of a historical 
structure should be understood as reciprocal. This means that ‘institutions are particular 
amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of ideas 
and material capabilities’ (Cox 1981: 137). Historical structures may become hegemonic 
when dominant ideas become accepted as common sense and powerful actors maintain 
their dominance largely through consent rather than coercion. Thus, hegemony is 
understood as ‘an expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of 
ideas and supported by material resources and institutions’ (Bieler and Morton 2004: 87). 
Assessing the prospects for agency, therefore, becomes central in an evaluation of any 
counterhegemonic project. Such a commitment to the significance of the ideational, 
nonetheless situated within material circumstances, is the basis upon which agency is 
understood within the analysis of the post-Cotonou negotiations that follows in the rest of 
this article. 
 
The other potential pitfall of discussing ‘African agency’ is that we end up with a 
conceptualisation of Africa as a single entity. It is clear that ‘given the diversity of the 
continent, speaking unproblematically of “African agency” in the singular is hazardous’ 
(Brown 2012: 1891). As this article demonstrates, in the case of the post-Cotonou 
negotiations, the question of who speaks for Africa remains heavily contested. The AU has 
sought to assert itself as the representative voice of African interests, but individual states 
retain a privileged role in the framework of EU-ACP relations. As the final section of this 
article outlines, non-state actors also represent an expression of African agency, 
articulated both within and outside the formal mechanisms established for such dialogue. 
Thus, the following sections seek to evaluate recent institutional developments within the 
EU and Africa, combined with the material and ideational structures, within which the EU 
and Africa are negotiating a post-Cotonou agreement, in order to evaluate how much 
scope there is for African agency to shape the eventual outcome. Before this analysis, 
however, it is important to consider changes within the historical structure and the extent 
to which this differs from that which set the frame for the negotiations towards the Cotonou 
Agreement in the late 1990s. 
 
HISTORICAL STRUCTURE 
The historical structure has been important in the past in shaping the nature of the 
relationship between the EU and ACP states. In fact, the European Commission itself, in 
its proposals to the Council and the European Parliament, argued that the post-Cotonou 
negotiations are ‘an opportunity to make the partnership fit for purpose in light of today’s 
challenges in a changed world’ (European Commission 2016a: 5). This section assesses 
the nature of the contemporary historical structure as Africa re-negotiates its relationship 
with the EU. It notes that although the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) version of 
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neoliberalism remains significant, some broader geopolitical changes do suggest there is 
scope for Africa to exercise more agency during the post-Cotonou negotiations. 
The PWC became the development orthodoxy of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund in the late 1990s. It acknowledged that during the period since the early 
1990s ‘neoliberalism had failed to create a sufficient number of productive employment 
opportunities in many countries in the Global South’ (Hurt 2016: 549). As a result, the 
PWC envisages a greater role for the state in development. However, this role is essentially 
reducible to creating the institutional environment whereby the private sector can most 
effectively fulfil its function as the main driver of development. Since the early 2000s, the 
EU has closely followed the PWC in its approach to development policy and these ideas 
remain at the centre of the recently updated European Consensus on Development (see 
Council of the European Union, European Parliament and European Commission 2017). 
Hence, the PWC continues to inform the EU’s ideational vision for its future relationship 
with the ACP states. 
 
The adoption of the SDGs in 2015 sets the broad framework within which the post-Cotonou 
negotiations will take place.3 It is noticeable that both the EU and ACP negotiating 
directives make frequent references to the SDGs. It is important to recognise that the 
assumptions inherent to the PWC underpin the SDGs. As Langan suggests ‘the free market 
and pro-business discourse of the SDGs is … a regurgitation of long-standing donor norms 
concerning the need to align poverty reduction strategies to the interests of the private 
sector’ (2018: 181). 
 
With respect to the governance of world trade, the most striking trend, since the 
negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement, is the exponential growth of bilateral trade 
agreements. The EU in its approach to external trade strategy has played a leading role in 
this regard. At the time of writing, 302 regional trade agreements are in force globally, 
with half of these covering both goods and services (World Trade Organization 2019). At 
the multilateral level, we have seen examples of the effective deployment of African 
agency. For example, within the World Trade Organization (WTO) it has been convincingly 
argued that African states have used ‘the prevailing discourse of development … to resist 
a multilateral trade agreement that falls short of their expectations of what is promised’ 
(Lee 2013: 35). The key question is whether Africa is now able to replicate such an 
approach in regional and bilateral relations with the EU. 
 
An important geopolitical context for the post-Cotonou negotiations is the increasing focus 
of the emerging powers in Africa. The European Commission made this clear, in its 
consultation paper on the re-negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement, stating that ‘Brazil, 
China and India are strategically positioning themselves in these regions with an increased 
presence, growing investment and trade relations, and a growing cooperation portfolio’ 
(European Commission 2015: 6). What does this mean in terms of African agency? It has 
been argued that the increasing role played by China and has provided scope for political 
and business elites in Africa to shape the terms of this relationship (Mohan and Lampert 
2013: 109-110). Certainly, it is clear that African countries now have ideational 
alternatives to the PWC orthodoxy offered by the established powers. In fact it was this 
prospect of increasing links with Southern partners that informed African resistance to the 
EU’s inclusion of a Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clause in the EPA negotiations (Vickers 
2013: 686). The adoption of such a clause in the EPAs would require ACP states to offer 
the EU matching trade preferences, to those potentially agreed to in any future trade 
agreements, with other major trading partners. 
 
However, we should be wary of assuming that this growing interest from the emerging 
powers, in particular China, will automatically result in positive outcomes across Africa. 
There is evidence that effective African agency is at least possible in these new 
relationships. For example, the Ethiopian government has ‘used its strategic partnership 
with China and India as an explicit bargaining chip in its negotiations with European donors 
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and vice versa’ (Cheru 2016: 605). However, as Taylor warns, the impact of African 
engagement with emerging powers is contingent on ‘the conjectural circumstances in each 
state formation and the nature of the external partners … the key question remains: how 
can African leaders take advantage for the benefit of the ordinary citizen?’ (Taylor 2018: 
318). Hence, Philips argues that, in the case of Ghana’s relationship with China, ‘state 
agents shaped the brokerage and outcomes of bilateral assistance, yet the scope for 
agency over economic structures was narrow’ (2019: 123). His view is that in considering 
the agency of African elites, we must pay sufficient attention to the structures of the global 
political economy within which such agency occurs. In many cases, it is African elites, 
rather than the wider population, that benefit from the increased scope for agency afforded 
by these new external partners. 
 
In sum, the post-Cotonou negotiations are taking place in a context where neoliberalism, 
in its PWC form, remains the orthodoxy. In world trade, meanwhile, the trend, exemplified 
by the EU, is for bilateral trade agreements rather than multilateralism. This places limits 
on what African states can hope to achieve in the post-Cotonou negotiations. However, 
the increasing engagement of emerging powers, especially China, does potentially allow 
African states more room for manoeuvre. In the next section, I consider recent institutional 
developments within Africa, the first of the three elements that comprise a Coxian 
understanding of historical structures. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN AFRICA 
It is clear from the recent examples of effective African agency in a range of arenas that 
a collective negotiating stance is important. In this regard, Vickers argues that, ‘African 
countries require joint strategies and common positions, preferably at the AU or sub-
regional level, if they are to negotiate effectively with the rising and established powers’ 
(2013: 679). Similarly, Lay and von Soest (2018) argue that for Africa to achieve a 
substantive new post-Cotonou agreement with the EU, a strong continental negotiating 
position is required. However, during the early phase of the post-Cotonou negotiations, 
the ACP Group and the AU took quite different positions on the future of the EU-ACP 
framework. The ACP Group includes 48 Sub-Saharan African states, all of whom are also 
members of the AU. However, it does not include the five North African states (Algeria, 
Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) whose relationship with the EU falls under the remit of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy.4   
 
Historically, the ACP Group has been a relatively ineffective actor and has had little impact 
on global governance more broadly. This is unsurprising given that the original rationale 
for the formation of the ACP Group was to negotiate and implement agreements with the 
EU. It still relies on the EU for the funding of its secretariat and the ACP negotiating 
mandate for the post-Cotonou negotiations argues for this arrangement to be continued 
(ACP Council of Ministers 2018: 25). In the lead-up to the re-negotiation of the Cotonou 
Agreement, the Brussels-based Secretariat and Committee of Ambassadors were largely 
unsuccessful in their attempts to redefine the purpose of the ACP Group, as a potentially 
important player on the wider global stage. It has been convincingly argued, therefore, 
that the future viability of the ACP Group ‘is more related to its effective provision of 
patronage and EU funding benefits, than to its performance in relation to the Group’s 
formal mandate’ (Keijzer 2016: 520). In reality, its continued existence as a meaningful 
entity relies significantly, on negotiating something with the EU that looks very similar to 
the Cotonou Agreement. However, the EU’s proposal to include regional compacts in the 
negotiations, posed an immediate threat to the ongoing relevance of the ACP as a distinct 
group of states.  
 
Meanwhile, during the lifetime of the Cotonou Agreement we have seen the development 
of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which is reflective of an ongoing shift towards the 
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EU working more directly with the AU. The official portrayal of the JAES is that it provides 
an opportunity for a more balanced, less-dependent, relationship between Europe and 
Africa. It also signals an acknowledgement by the EU of the heightened status of the AU 
as an institution. In fact, due to a request by the AU, the 2017 summit held in Abidjan, 
Côte d'Ivoire, under the auspices of the JAES, was renamed an AU-EU meeting, rather 
than ‘Africa-EU’ as previous summits had been. In the final declaration from the Abidjan 
Summit, the AU and EU agreed that there was an ‘opportunity for a paradigm shift to an 
even stronger, mutually beneficial partnership in the spirit of shared ownership, 
responsibility, reciprocity, respect and mutual accountability and transparency’ (AU-EU 
2017: 1). 
 
It is clear that the change from the Organisation of African Unity to the AU in 2002 has 
precipitated a step-change in the coordination of continental politics. To date, this has 
been most noticeable in the fields of peace and security as seen in developments like the 
AU’s Peace and Security Architecture. Although not without significant limitations, we have 
also seen the emergence of common African negotiating positions via the AU, with the 
impact on the global climate change talks a particularly good example of effective African 
agency (see Zondi 2013). 
 
With respect to external economic relations, the AU, has until recently, been rather less 
effective. The AU-backed New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was the initial 
focal point for its approach in this area. As Taylor notes, NEPAD conformed to the 
assumptions of the PWC, by focusing on a pact with external donors around the 
implementation of ‘good governance’ (Taylor 2010: 54). In the last few years, however, 
the progress made towards the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) 
demonstrates the more significant prospect of the AU’s ability to exercise agency in the 
global political economy. One of the AU’s longstanding limitations has been its significant 
reliance on external financing. The CFTA includes a plan to levy a tariff of 0.2% on imports 
from outside the continent, which some African states have already implemented, to raise 
the funds needed to ensure the AU is eventually self-funded. 
 
So, what are the prospects for the AU to exert agency on the post-Cotonou negotiations? 
Historically, the AU has not participated in EU-ACP negotiations given that its membership 
also includes North African states outside of this framework. The EU has suggested that 
the regional compact with Africa could serve as a potential replacement for the current 
JAES (European Commission 2017: 3). As a result, the AU expressed a strong desire to 
become directly involved in the negotiations (Carbone 2018: 484). 
 
In March 2018, the AU’s Executive Council announced the adoption of a draft common 
African position, which called for a ‘single framework for cooperation from Union to 
Union/continent to continent, independently of the ACP–EU framework’ (AU 2018a). In 
September of the same year, however, the Executive Council failed to consolidate these 
plans into a concrete AU negotiating mandate. It is suggested, that this was due to the 
preference of some African states for continuing with an intergovernmental approach, via 
the ACP Group, whereby aid recipients would be more confident of maintaining their levels 
of development assistance from the EU (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019: 4). In addition, when 
push comes to shove not all African states are actually that willing to advocate for greater 
pan-Africanism and a transfer of power to the AU. Resistance to the common African 
position ‘came from most countries in West Africa, particularly Senegal and Burkina Faso, 
as well as many in East Africa, such as Uganda and Kenya’ (Carbone 2018: 487). As a 
result, in November 2018, an extraordinary AU summit agreed that the existing ACP 
negotiating team should continue to lead the post-Cotonou negotiations (AU 2018b). To 
satisfy the AU’s desire to remain involved, a compromise proposal for AU mandated 
officials to be able to oversee the negotiation of the regional protocol with the EU, was 
subsequently suggested (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019: 5). 
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In sum, Langan envisages that Pan-Africanism ‘could offer a real path to emancipatory 
agency in the continent’ (2018: 224). The key word here is ‘could’ and at present the 
tensions discussed in this section, between the ACP, AU and its member states, have 
undermined the prospects for Africa to capitalise on the potential for agency that it has in 
the post-Cotonou negotiations. As a result, we have seen a reinforcement of a twin-track 
approach to African relations with the EU. This will ‘deepen the rift between AU-EU 
cooperation on peace and security, high-level dialogue on key issues such as migration 
and investment on one side, and bilateral political dialogue and development cooperation 
on the other’ (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019: 6-7). Ultimately, these institutional 
developments do not take place outside of the ideational and material relations 
underpinning the relationship between the EU and Africa. These aspects are the focus of 
the following two sections. 
IDEAS AND THE EU’S VISION FOR PRIVATE-SECTOR LED DEVELOPMENT 
This section highlights how the EU’s ideational stance on development has framed the 
periodic negotiation of agreements with the ACP states and how this remains the case for 
the post-Cotonou negotiations. While African elites have often shared the EU’s vision there 
have been challenges to it on occasions. The historical structure and in particular the 
material relations between the two parties, have largely determined the extent to which 
such ideational challenges from Africa, have produced tangible outcomes in the nature of 
the EU-ACP relationship. 
The legacies of European colonial rule of Africa remain visible in the way that current EU 
policymakers view the future relationship between the two continents. In this sense, we 
should remember that the link, between European integration and the exploitation of 
Africa, has long been understood as mutually reinforcing. As Hansen and Jonsson suggest 
in their important recent study: 
Eurafrica was an intellectual endeavour and a political project that from the 1920s 
saw Europe’s future survival … as totally bound up with Europe’s successful merger 
with Africa … even as the Eurafrican project is largely forgotten, the content of current 
EU policy-making towards its African ‘partner’ demonstrates that it has continued 
influence under the surface (Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 277-278). 
The idea of Eurafrica was essentially about securing Europe’s economic future and 
European policymakers are applying a similar line of reasoning today. For example, the 
EU’s recent foreign policy strategy argues that the EU ‘will invest in African peace and 
development as an investment in our own security and prosperity’ (European Commission 
2016b: 36). 
The negotiation of the first Lomé Convention in the mid-1970s did reflect a relative degree 
of agency by the ACP states. Inspired by calls within the UN General Assembly for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO), the ACP Group succeeded in achieving a number of 
important concessions from the EU, such as the inclusion of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences and protocols guaranteeing prices for specific commodities exported to the 
European market. The idea being that African countries ‘would be able to stabilise their 
raw material production while at the same time using such earnings to diversify into agro-
processing and manufacturing’ (Langan 2018: 123). 
From the early 1980s onwards, however, we saw within the EU-ACP framework, the 
increasing adoption of a neoliberal understanding of development, whereby economic 
liberalisation is the central guiding principle. These neoliberal underpinnings of the EU’s 
vision for African development have remained consistent since then. As it prepared for the 
Cotonou Agreement negotiations, the EU made it clear that a return to reciprocal trade 
liberalisation was their preferred outcome. As a result, the Cotonou Agreement 
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represented ‘a substantial shift towards the adoption of neoliberal values’ (Hurt 2003: 
164). 
During this period, particularly during Lomé IV, the EU increasingly began to focus on the 
role of private sector development (PSD) in its engagement with ACP states. In its 1996 
Green Paper, which set out the European vision for future relations with ACP states, the 
Commission argued that most ACP states had been unable to secure the benefits of the 
trade preferences accorded under Lomé, due to the lack of an environment conducive to 
private sector growth (European Commission 1996: 11). Hence, under the Cotonou 
Agreement, the EU focused its development assistance on PSD, as this was understood to 
be the mechanism to ensure that ACP states enjoyed the developmental benefits of 
reciprocal trade liberalisation (Langan 2016: 100). This focus on PSD ‘reflects ongoing 
attempts to embed global market integration in path-dependent ways and increasingly 
sophisticated inter-scalar linkages between the EU and sub-regional, national and sub-
national interests in the ACP’ (Price and Nunn 2016: 458). At the same time, the Cotonou 
Agreement reflected a discursive shift, in line with the PWC, with the language of 
partnership and country-ownership combined with the inclusion of budget support and Aid 
for Trade (AfT) in the EU’s development assistance. In sum, the EU portrayed the inclusion 
of reciprocal trade relations in the Cotonou Agreement as the central driver of its pro-poor 
development agenda. 
The negotiating position adopted by the EU for a post-Cotonou agreement does not deviate 
from this PWC approach. The EU’s mandate suggests that ‘the promotion of investment 
and private sector development should be at the heart of the partnership’ (Council of the 
European Union 2018: 13). Moreover, the section of the EU’s negotiating mandate focused 
specifically on Africa, reasserts the connection noted above between the need for PSD to 
realise the benefits of trade liberalisation. It argues for the need to ‘strengthen 
mechanisms, procedures and institutions to enhance capacity to establish and implement 
trade policies, as well as to enable [sic] private sector to take advantage of such policies 
and the increased opportunities’ (Council of the European Union 2018: 40). 
The ideas at the heart of the EU’s vision for its relationship with ACP states have therefore 
shown a level of continuity over a number of decades. Although, there have been 
discursive shifts in line with the prevailing development discourse of the day, the 
fundamental belief in a broadly neoliberal approach remains intact. Apart from the 
concessions won during the first Lomé Convention negotiations, there has been little 
evidence of effective agency by African actors seeking to challenge the EU at the ideational 
level. 
The ACP states’ post-Cotonou negotiating mandate shares many of the ideas at the heart 
of the EU’s vision. For example, it is suggested that one of the specific objectives of a new 
agreement should be to ‘increase the role of the private sector in the social and economic 
transformation of ACP Member States in particular by improving the business climate for 
private sector development’ (ACP Council of Ministers 2018: 8). Where it does differ, as 
discussed further in the next section, is that there are calls for the policy space to allow 
ACP states to pursue industrialisation. This has been a particular focus within Africa over 
recent years. In 2008, the AU adopted its ‘Action Plan for Accelerated Industrial 
Development in Africa’ (see AU 2008). It also features strongly in the AU’s ‘Agenda 2063’ 
document, which notes that ‘African economies have not been sufficiently transformed and 
continue to be commodity-based, with weak value addition, poor manufacturing and 
industrialization’ (AU 2015: 5). One of the central projects of Agenda 2063 is the CFTA. A 
key focus of the CFTA project is industrialisation, whereby it is envisioned that ‘creating a 
single African market … will boost incentives to source inputs and intermediates from 
within Africa, which is expected to support the expansion of manufacturing sectors’ (UN 
Economic Commission for Africa 2017: 13). The prospects for African industrialisation, 
however, are to a significant extent shaped by the nature of trade agreements negotiated 
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with external partners. Hence, the nature of Africa’s future trade and investment 
relationship with the EU, discussed in the next section, remains highly significant to the 
realisation of this vision. 
Overall, this section has argued that even allowing for the more conducive historical 
structure and in particular the institutional capabilities discussed above, at the ideational 
level, experience would suggest that African states have limited agency and, to some 
extent desire, to fundamentally challenge the EU’s vision for a post-Cotonou agreement. 
The next section considers the material relations between the EU and Africa that set the 
parameters within which such ideational debates take place. 
THE MATERIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND AFRICA: TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN A POST-
COUTONOU AGREEMENT 
This section provides analysis of the continuities and changes in the material relations 
between the EU and Africa, since 2000 when the Cotonou Agreement was signed. Given 
the fact that, unlike the Caribbean region, comprehensive EPAs including services and 
investment have not been agreed, the main change in circumstances has been in respect 
of merchandise trade. Trade in goods between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa has become 
relatively less significant for the latter since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. As 
Figure 1 below demonstrates, there has been a decline in the relative significance of both 
exports from Sub-Saharan Africa to the EU and imports from the EU to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Figure 1: Significance of Trade in Goods between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2018 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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In 2000, the EU was the destination for 35.5 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s total exports 
but by 2018 this had fallen to 22.9 per cent. Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa imported 30.6 
per cent of its total imports from the EU in 2000 but in 2018 this had dropped to 21.3 per 
cent. This trend has resulted in a change in the geographic profile of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
trade. As Figures 2 and 3 below highlight, in 2018 intra-continental trade is significant as 
is trade with China and the Middle East, while India is a major partner (particularly as a 
destination for African exports). 
Figure 2: Geography of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Goods Exports, 2018 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
74,573 
72,600 
59,531 
38,998 
18,376 
12,541 
11,506 
6,805 
5,483 
4,645 
4,136 
2,893 
2,734 2,661 
2,539 
29,898 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: EXPORTS 2018
European Union
Africa
China (Mainland)
India
United States
Middle East
Switzerland
Japan
Indonesia
Singapore
South Korea
Malaysia
Canada
Brazil
China (Hong Kong)
OtherUS DOLLARS millions
152 
Figure 3: Geography of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Goods Imports, 2018 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Over the last decade, as Figure 4 demonstrates, for both imports and exports, the five 
North African states that are outside of the ACP Group have consistently contributed close 
to, and occasionally more than, half of Africa’s trade with the EU.5 This highlights the much 
greater significance of the African continent as a whole, rather than the ACP Group, with 
respect to the material interests of the EU.6 It also reinforces the argument that ‘African 
agency’ may be most effectively employed at the continental level. 
As discussed in the previous section, the promotion of European investment in Africa is 
central to the EU’s Post-Cotonou negotiating mandate. It is also a key focus of the new 
Africa-Europe Alliance discussed below. The EU continues to hold the highest total stock 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Total investment stock held by EU member 
states in Africa totalled EUR 261 billion in 2017 (European Commission 2019). However, 
similar to recent trends in relation to the trade in goods, China in particular has 
significantly increased its stock of FDI in Africa, from USD 26 billion in 2013 to USD 43 
billion in 2017 (UNCTAD 2019: 34). 
These material realities are clearly reflected in the negotiating directives adopted by the 
European Council, which outline the ‘significance of trade and investment for the overall 
relations between the ACP and the EU, as well as for the development of the ACP 
economies’ (Council of the European Union 2018: 16). The EU negotiating directives also 
reaffirm a commitment to the EPAs and to ‘the possibility for widening and deepening the 
agreements where appropriate, in line with the rendezvous clauses’ (Council of the 
European Union 2018: 16).7 During the early phase of the EPA negotiations, the implied 
threat of ACP states losing preferential trade access to the EU market, gave the EU 
leverage in securing their broad vision for reciprocal free trade agreements and their desire 
to include services and the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ (Heron and Murray-Evans 2018: 
206).8 However, African states were able to employ discursive power in the EPA 
negotiations, by holding the EU to account to its own rhetoric of development. There are, 
however, limits to what such an approach can achieve and in particular they have found 
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on DG Trade data. 
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it hard to move ‘from a strategy of resistance to agenda-setting’ (Hurt et al. 2013: 83). 
From a Coxian perspective, an ability to also challenge the existing material relations 
would represent effective African agency in this regard. 
Moreover, it is important to remember that the idea of negotiating EPAs was an EU project 
from the outset. The European Commission (1996) set out its vision for reciprocal trade 
agreements with ACP countries in a Green Paper during its preparations for the Cotonou 
Agreement negotiations. By contrast, in the following year, the ACP Group were still 
arguing for a continuation of non-reciprocal trade preferences (ACP Heads of State and 
Government 1997). Price and Nunn (2016: 460) convincingly highlight how, despite the 
relatively effective African-led resistance campaign, the EU has still achieved a set of EPAs 
that will lock-in a gradual process of liberalisation for decades to come. 
In response, as discussed in the previous section, the ACP’s negotiating mandate differs 
from that of the EU in terms of its specific emphasis on the policy space for 
industrialisation. It calls for both parties to ‘seek to cooperate in formulating and 
implementing policies in various key areas, including supporting agro-processing, 
manufacturing, mineral beneficiation and down-stream processing in the ACP countries’ 
(ACP Council of Ministers 2018: 17). This connection between trade policy and 
industrialisation has been developed in a range of African policymaking forums in recent 
years. For example, the UN Economic Commission for Africa has argued there is an explicit 
link between EPAs and Africa’s prospects for industrialisation. They argue that EPAs ‘would 
see a significant influx of European Union exports to African countries in almost all sectors 
(especially in industrial goods) … which may undermine efforts to industrialize and 
diversify’ (UN Economic Commission for Africa 2017: 15). Similar claims have been made 
in the academic literature on EPAs. For example, in the case of West Africa, Langan 
demonstrates how they threaten domestic agro-processing and manufacturing sectors, 
resulting in both deindustrialisation and concerns over food security (2018: 119-142). 
Historically, the EU’s response to such concerns has been to emphasise the support 
available through AfT money. Beyond this, however, it would appear unlikely, given the 
earlier analysis of the EU’s ideational vision that these concerns will result in structural 
changes to the material relations between the EU and Africa. What African states have not 
been able to do, to this point, is fundamentally change the nature of their trade relationship 
with the EU. Data for 2018 highlights that a broadly neo-colonial pattern persists, with the 
majority of EU exports being manufactures (65.5 per cent), while the majority of the 
imports from the African members of the ACP Group are primary goods (73.3 per cent) 
(Author calculation based on DG Trade data). 
Alongside the post-Cotonou negotiations, the European Commission announced a proposal 
for ‘A new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs’ in September 2018 
(see European Commission 2018). In the view of the Commission, this would provide a 
joint economic strategy between the EU and Africa, which would complement the JAES 
that provides a political framework for cooperation. The idea for the new Africa-Europe 
Alliance formed part of Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2018 State of the Union address, where he 
outlined how the EU ‘should develop the numerous European-African trade agreements 
into a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as an economic partnership between 
equals’ (Juncker 2018). The aim is for this new Africa-Europe Alliance to work in tandem 
with the External Investment Plan (EIP), which the EU adopted in September 2017. Of 
course, any new continent-to-continent FTA would not be possible in the short-medium 
term given that the successful implementation of the AU’s CFTA would be a prerequisite. 
There have been concerns raised in response to the European Commission’s claim that the 
existing EPAs provide the building blocks towards a larger EU-Africa FTA. For example, 
Viwanou Gnassounou, then Assistant Secretary General of the ACP group of states, has 
suggested that EPAs are ‘not encouraging regional integration … [and] are not preparing 
the way to create regional value chains, creating growth and employment’ (Chadwick 
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2018). Meanwhile, Johannes Trimmel, President of the European Confederation of Relief 
and Development NGOs (CONCORD), also expressed concern by arguing that ‘investments 
that put commercial opportunities for EU companies at the centre rather than people’s 
needs … are not worthy of the proud values of our continent or likely to endear us to our 
neighbours’ (Trimmel 2018). 
In essence, there appears to be nothing essentially ‘new’ about the proposals for the 
Europe-Africa Alliance. Rather, it appears to be an attempt to boost the profile of Africa 
within the EU’s broader global agenda. Teevan and Sherriff (2019) suggest that there was 
a lack of African input into its formation and that even EU member states were not 
consulted. The aim is to reinforce a move away from development cooperation towards a 
focus on encouraging European private sector investment into Africa. A combination of 
financial support to reduce the risk of investments, combined with a strengthening of the 
investment climate in Africa itself, are the mechanisms identified to achieve this. In 
essence then, a locking-in of the ideational approach based on neoliberalism, whereby an 
attractive environment for foreign investment is prioritised (e.g. low taxes, flexible labour 
markets, etc.) rather than an approach with human development and sustainability at its 
core. 
It remains to be seen whether the new Europe-Africa Alliance will increase the prospects 
for African agency. It seems to be very much an EU-led initiative with tacit support from 
the AU. As such, it seems that the EU is legitimating the further development of alternative 
institutional arrangements with Africa, which are outside of the post-Cotonou negotiations. 
The ambitious plans for a future EU-Africa FTA might provide scope for Africa to exert 
more influence on the terms by which trade with Europe will be organised in the future, in 
comparison to the regional EPA negotiations, which have created an ‘internal’ system of 
competition for market access between ACP sub-regions (Langan 2018: 124). However, 
as argued above, the broad patterns of trade between Europe and Africa remain neo-
colonial in character and the continued application of EPAs over the coming years will 
merely reinforce this situation. 
AFRICAN NON-STATE ACTORS: CHALLENGING HISTORICAL STRUCTURES? 
In considering the scope for African agency on the post-Cotonou negotiations, we should 
also consider the role played by non-state actors across the continent. It has been noted 
that, African non-state actors can both ‘form the constituencies of interest to which state 
leaders must relate and thus have a role in shaping state preferences and … they also 
interact more directly with ‘external’ international agencies and organisations’ (Brown 
2012: 1893). Of course, not all non-state actors in Africa adopt a counter-hegemonic 
position and their agency can also be employed to reproduce aspects of the existing 
historical structure. As Langan argues ‘certain NGOs may not be a progressive instrument 
for poverty reduction and ‘development’ but, conversely, might be used to frustrate the 
empirical sovereignty of Africa’s governments’ (2018: 213). Nevertheless, in the recent 
history of EU-ACP relations, there have been examples of social movements and NGOs 
arguing effectively for progressive change (see Trommer 2011). In this final section, I 
consider the input of both African NGOs and trade unions, as actors with the potential to 
exert an alternative form of African agency that might challenge the historical structures 
already identified. 
There are formal mechanisms that allow for the involvement of non-state actors in shaping 
the post-Cotonou negotiations. In 2015, the European Commission opened a public 
consultation on the plans for a new partnership agreement between the EU and ACP. In 
March 2016, the results were published and it is noticeable that, of the 103 total responses 
received, only 23 were from respondents based in Africa.9 Although not all the contributors 
agreed to have their individual submissions published, it would appear that the most 
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familiar African NGOs, social movements and trade unions did not provide submissions to 
the consultation process. Beyond this public consultation process, the European 
Commission would also point to the fact that, since 2012, it organises the annual Policy 
Forum for Development (PFD), which creates a framework for dialogue with non-state 
actors. In addition to the annual ‘global meeting’ of the PFD, regional meetings have also 
been held, including two in Africa, the most recent of which took place from 8-10 October 
2018, in Gaborone, Botswana. The problem with these formalised avenues for civil society 
dialogue is that they tend to lead to a very structured engagement. For example, 
respondents to the public consultation had to answer a series of very specific questions 
designed by the European Commission. Hence, they tend to replicate both the dangers of 
co-option and the ‘insider-outsider’ problems identified in the civil society mechanisms 
institutionalised within EU free trade agreements (see Orbie et al. 2016). 
This may explain why a number of African non-state actors, who are critical of the nature 
of the EU’s relationship with Africa, choose to operate outside of these formally constructed 
frameworks for dialogue. A number of groups have expressed their views in relation to the 
negotiations for a new EU-ACP agreement. In March 2018, the African Trade Network 
hosted a meeting of civil society organisations from across both ACP states and Europe. 
The resolutions resulting from this meeting included a call for the preservation of the policy 
space of ACP states and an end to any plans to broaden or deepen EPAs (Africa Trade 
Network 2018). In October 2018, a joint statement by both African and European trade 
union confederations expressed similar views. This called for the replacement of EPAs with 
a more progressive trade arrangement between the EU and Africa given that they ‘pose 
significant risks to sustainable development, stable employment, labour standards and 
public services as well as democracy in African countries’ (ITUC-Africa et al. 2018). 
We have also seen concerns raised over the level of agency that African non-state actors 
are able to exert on the post-Cotonou negotiations. In April 2018, in Harare, a meeting 
organised by the Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiation Institute 
(SEATINI) Zimbabwe, concluded that grassroots voices are rarely considered and that 
non-state actors in Africa must devise a clear strategy for engaging with the post-Cotonou 
negotiations (SEATINI Zimbabwe 2018). In general, social movements and civil society 
organisations are often fragmented and lacking co-ordination and those working on issues 
of development and trade justice in Africa are no different. Ultimately, I would share the 
concerns of Langan (2018: 215) who argues that although African NGOs and trade unions 
are able to articulate potentially counter-hegemonic ideas, which might enhance the 
agency of African governments, they lack the ability to achieve radical transformation of 
Africa’s relations with the EU. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, this article has explored the scope for African agency within the post-
Cotonou negotiations. In so doing, it recognises the historical structure within which the 
negotiations are taking place and provides analysis of the institutional, ideational and 
material relations between the EU and Africa. It has been argued that, compared to the 
Cotonou Agreement negotiations, there is more scope for African agency. However, the 
ideational vision of the EU remains firmly embedded within a PWC version of neoliberalism. 
African actors must provide a sustained counter-hegemonic challenge to this, if they are 
going to be able to fundamentally alter the nature of their relationship with the EU. 
For Africa to successfully redefine its relationship with Europe there must be an awareness 
that ‘in the absence of an overarching African vision and creative leadership to steer the 
future, this opportunity may become lost’ (Khadiagala 2018: 442). Given recent 
developments in the AU, there is an increasing focus on pan-Africanism providing the most 
effective approach to African agency. Invoking the ideas of Kwame Nkrumah, Langan has 
recently called for ‘African countries in the lead-up to a post-Cotonou pact with the EU … 
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to consider the potential of pan-African co-operation for achieving more equitable trade 
arrangements’ (2018: 223). There is some merit in the view that a continental approach 
would increase the scope for African agency in the negotiations. However, as this article 
has demonstrated, divisions between the ACP Group, the AU and its member states, have 
restricted the ability of African actors to take advantage of the increased space for African 
agency. 
Pan-Africanism is not a panacea, given the ideational, material and institutional structures 
analysed in this article. Changes at the institutional level need to be combined with 
counter-hegemonic challenges to the dominant ideas and material realities, which I have 
argued underpin the EU’s relationship with Africa. Ultimately, any consideration of the 
scope for African agency within the post-Cotonou negotiations needs to acknowledge that 
there remain important structural limits at play. Ultimately, pursuing a new EU-ACP 
agreement ‘may reduce Africa’s ability to effectively defend its own interests autonomously 
at continental level on a host of pressing issues such as trade, investment, migration, 
climate change’ (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019: 8). Instead, focusing on future relations at 
an EU-AU level, rather than pursuing the re-negotiation of Cotonou, may offer Africa the 
clearest route to exercising agency in its relations with Europe. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Throughout this article, I use EU to represent the European Union and the organisation, pre-Maastricht Treaty, officially 
referred to as the European Economic Community. The ACP Group includes 79 states (48 African, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific) 
who were all signatories of the Cotonou Agreement, except for Cuba. Since 5 April 2020, the name of this group was officially 
changed to the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) 
2 Funding of EU development assistance to ACP states comes from the European Development Fund (EDF). The eleventh EDF 
is due to expire in December 2020, which is also when the EU’s Multi-Annual Financial Framework ends. 
3 The Cotonou Agreement was finalised before the adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals and a reference to 
them was only included after the first revision of the agreement in 2005. 
4 The AU has 55 member states in total. In addition to the 48 African ACP states and the five North African states, South 
Sudan and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic are also members. 
5 These five countries are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The respective Association Agreements that these 
states have with the EU covers their trade, except for Libya, which at the time of writing does not have one. 
6 It is worth noting that the EU’s total trade in goods with the Caribbean states (EUR 11,825 million in 2018) and Pacific states 
(EUR 3,842 million) is relatively small in comparison to Africa. 
7 It is important to note that the EPAs are separate international agreements and are therefore not a direct part of the post-
Cotonou negotiations. 
8 The ‘Singapore issues’ refers to competition policy, transparency in government procurement, national treatment for 
foreign investors, and trade facilitation measures, which the EU had initially sought to include in the Doha Round of the WTO. 
9 It is important to note that 25 of the 103 responses were from organisations, or individuals, based in Belgium, but that this 
category does include actors such as the ACP Civil Society Forum. 
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